The transmission ef® ciency of HIV-1 through unsafe medical injections can be estimated from seroconversions among health care workers (HCWs) after percutaneous exposures and documented iatrogenic outbreaks. Data from a case± control study of seroconversion after percutaneous exposures among US and European HCWs shows an average rate of seroconversion after deep injuries Ð arguably comparable to unsafe injections Ð of 2.3%. Information from an iatrogenic HIV outbreak in a Romanian orphanage suggests a transmission ef® ciency of 2± 7%. Even these estimates may be too low to explain the rapid spread of HIV among Russian and Libyan children in iatrogenic outbreaks discovered in 1988 and 1998, respectively. In countries in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere with high HIV prevalence and large numbers of unsafe injections, personal risk as well as the share of the HIV epidemic associated with unsafe injections may be an order of magnitude higher that many experts have supposed.
INTRODUCTION
Although it is widely recognized that unsafe medical injections are a risk for HIV-1 transmission in countries with generalized HIV epidemics Ð the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), for example, advises UN employees to carry syringes for own use in many developing countries 1 Ð the share of HIV incidence from medical injections has been a matter of conjecture for many years 2± 7 and remains so today. In 1983, the ® rst large World Health Organization (WHO) meeting to discuss AIDS in Africa warned about unsafe injections and was undecided about whether or not heterosexual promiscuity was a risk 8 . Attention to unsafe injections gave way over the next 5 years to mounting concern about heterosexual transmission. A 1988 paper from WHO's Global Program on AIDS estimated that only 1.6% of HIV prevalence in Africa was due tò inadequately sterilized skin-piercing instruments (health sector and outside)' versus 80% from heterosexual transmission 9 . This low estimate for HIV infections from unsafe injections has remained the dominant view.
According to a recent estimate, half of all injections in Africa and much of Asia are unsafe, while people get an average of 1± 2 injections per year 10, 11 . With hundreds of millions of unsafe medical injections in Africa each year Ð many in STD clinics and other settings with high HIV prevalence among those injected Ð the conventional estimate that unsafe injections are responsible for less than 2% of Africa's HIV infections depends crucially on the assumption that the transmission ef® ciency of HIV through unsafe injections, E(t), is very low. Experts have estimated E(t) as low as 0.3± 0.5% based on the average rate of seroconversion after percutaneous exposures for health care workers (HCWs) in the US and Europe 6, 11, 12 . Assuming E(t)=0.5%, Kane and colleagues estimated 50 000± 100 000 new HIV infections annually in Africa at the end of the 1990s from unsafe injections 11 , equivalent to about 1.3± 2.6% of total incidence in 2000 13 , which agrees with the WHO's 1988 estimate of 1.6%.
However, epidemiological evidence suggests much higher HIV transmission through unsafe injections and other health care exposures. For example, over the past 16 years, studies in many African countries have reported over 10% of HIVpositive children with HIV-negative mothers. Many children had no risks other than medical injections 14± 19 . Some of these studies took place in major hospitals with ongoing high-pro® le research on HIV/AIDS. Iatrogenic HIV transmission to African children may well have been even higher outside the purview of these studies. Many studies have found African adolescents and adults with no sexual exposures to HIV to have levels of prevalence or incidence as high as 10± 30% or more of the levels found in those with (possible) sexual exposures to HIV 20± 22 . In addition, data from multiple studies of risk factors for HIV prevalence 23± 27 and incidence 28± 30 show crude population attributable fractions (PAFs) for injections over 20%. However, since association between HIV infection and injections may be due at least in part to people with HIV seeking injections to treat symptoms, the interpretation of high PAFs is not clear.
To go beyond conjecture about the share of HIV incidence in Africa from unsafe medical injections, well-designed ® eld research is essential. One window into the issue is to investigate iatrogenic outbreaks (e.g. instances in which multiple HIVpositive children have HIV-negative mothers). This has not been done anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa as it has been in Russia 31± 34 , Romania 35± 38 and Libya 39 .
Another task is to design and implement epidemiological research that is able to unravel confounding between sexual and medical exposures. To date, only a handful of studies have been so designed. Data from one such study shows that HIV prevalence for persons with injections for STDs in the past 2 years was almost twice as high as for persons with STDs but no injections for STDs 40 . Unfortunately, data were arguably misinterpreted, and the study has been used for more than a decade to show that promiscuity with STDs is more dangerous than injections. Two studies have used genetic sequencing to trace epidemiological linkages in Uganda. One found no clustering of sequences among known sexual partners but two pairs from people with no known sexual contact 41 , while the other found ® ve clusters, only four of which could be explained by sexual contact 42 .
Over the last 18 years, laboratory studies have examined some of the factors contributing to transmission ef® ciency. In three studies, the mean amounts of blood transferred in simulations of sharing equipment for intravenous injections ranged over 1.3± 34 ml 43± 45 . From a sample of 54 persons with HIV, Ho et al. estimated 0.06± 7.0 tissue culture infectious doses (TCID) per ml of blood, with higher values in those with symptomatic AIDS 46 , while a later study reported even higher levels in some plasma samples 47 . High TCID levels are also found in those with primary infections before seroconversion 47± 49 , and for an extended period in children with immature immune systems 48, 50 .
One study found HIV RNA in 3.8% of syringes that had been used for intramuscular or subcutaneous injections on HIV-positive patients, even though no syringe contained more than 4.6 nl of blood. The authors speculated that the observed HIV RNA came from infected follicular dendritic cells via interstitial¯uid, rather than from blood 51 . Other studies show that HIV survives well in water for more than a week, that HIV in dried blood remains infectious for days 52 , and that dilute hypochlorite solutions (common in Africa to wash and store injection equipment awaiting use) may enhance HIV transmission 53 .
Isolated instances of HIV transmission have been documented in a variety of health care and injection scenarios. Transmission has been traced, inter alia, to sharing of needles for intramuscular injection of anabolic steroids 54 and vitamins 55 , acupuncture treatments 56 , and an infected multidose vial 57, 58 .
While laboratory ® ndings and isolated incidents of iatrogenic transmission are of some use in suggesting situations where HIV transmission is possible, as well as factors that might have an impact on transmission ef® ciency, good estimates of transmission ef® ciency must be built on epidemiological analyses of multiple seroconversions after unsafe injections or comparable events.
METHODS
This study reviews available information on HIV transmission through unsafe injections and comparable parenteral exposures in four groups of people for which there is suf® cient information to provide some insight into the range of plausible values for E(t). These groups are: (a) HCWs with percutaneous exposures in the US, France, and UK 59, 60 ; children infected in iatrogenic outbreaks in (b) Elista, Russia during 1988± 89 31± 34 ; (c) a Romanian orphanage in 1988± 90 35 ; and (d) Libya in the late 1990s 39 . The study also reviews an estimate of the probability of HIV infection after contaminated injections among injecting drug users (IDUs) in New Haven, Connecticut 61 .
For this paper, the transmission ef® ciency of HIV through unsafe injections, E(t), is de® ned as the expected number of new HIV infections after injections contaminated from a single injection administered to someone with HIV, assuming all subsequent injections are unsafe and injectees are susceptible. With this de® nition, transmission involves transfer of HIV virus from an infected injectee to medical equipment (or, more generally, to the medical environment, including the needle and syringe used, multidose vials, rinsing pans, etc.) and then from contaminated medical equipment, vaccines, etc, to establish one or more new HIV infections in subsequent injectees. Hence, transmission ef® ciency of HIV through unsafe injections, E(t), depends on E(c), the expected number of subsequent injections contaminated after a single injection administered to someone with HIV, and P(i), the probability that someone taking a contaminated injection will seroconvert:
This expected number of new infections is reduced if some of the subsequent injections are safe and/or injectees are already infected. If C(t) is the constrained expected number of new infections, C(t) depends on: P(u), the probability that subsequent injections are unsafe; P(s), the probability that subsequent injectees are susceptible; and E(t):
In iatrogenic outbreaks, if I is the number of injections administered to those with HIV infections, and T is the number of new infections from iatrogenic transmission:
Hence, E(t) depends on T, I, P(u), and P(s), as follows:
Equation (4) is in a form that allows us to estimate E(t) from iatrogenic outbreaks, using information about the number of iatrogenic infections, the number of injections administered to those with HIV infections, the per cent of injections that are unsafe (we do not need to know how many such injections are contaminated), and the per cent of injections administered to those who are susceptible. Equation (4) measures the ef® ciency of iatrogenic transmission by analysing the ratio of new iatrogenic to previous infections; hence I (injections administered to those with HIV infections) is in the denominator. In contrast, many discussions of unsafe injections focus on risks to those who are uninfected, so that the key equation presents a ratio of new infections to total exposures, with the denominator showing the number of contaminated injections for those who are susceptible. While this measure of individual risk is useful for some purposes, without other information it does not show how fast existing infections transmit to others through unsafe injections. Furthermore, the measure is unwieldy to use in analysing iatrogenic outbreaks since the denominator Ð the number of contaminated injections for those not yet infected Ð depends not only on I but also on E(c), which is hard to estimate.
In any speci® c setting or study, E(t) depends not only on the type of injection (e.g. intravenous or intramuscular) and characteristics of the source patient (e.g. viral load) but also on patterns of needle and/or syringe reuse, as well as other medical practices that might spread HIV from an infected syringe to multidose vials, rinsing pans, and so forth. Clearly, E(t) will vary across clinics and over time. To design corrective interventions, it may be useful to identify factors that contribute to high or low E(t), but that task goes beyond what is attempted in this paper.
RESULTS

Health care workers with percutaneous exposures
In the mid-1990s, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), with UK and French public health authorities, conducted a case± control study of 33 HCWs who seroconverted to HIV after percutaneous exposures and 655 controls 59, 60 . Although the average rate of seroconversion after percutaneous exposures was estimated at 0.3%, the study identi® ed 5 risk factors with adjusted odds ratios (OR) signi® cantly different from one: deep injury, OR=15; visible blood on device, OR=6.2; procedure involving needle in vein or artery, OR=4.3; terminal illness in source patient (i.e. death within 2 months), OR=5.6; and postexposure use of zidovudine, OR=0.19 57 . The OR for no postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) would be about 5.3 (the reciprocal of 0.19). Since the study worked with only 33 seroconversions, there are large con® dence intervals around all of the above ORs.
As a ® rst approximation, unsafe injections in medical settings are comparable to deep injuries without PEP. Although the case± control study did not give a ® gure for the average risk for deep injuries, this can be calculated from the average risk for all percutaneous exposures (0.3%), the share of controls with deep injuries (6.8%), and the share of cases with deep injuries (52%). Fifty-two per cent of all cases (and all risk) was concentrated in the 6.8% of percutaneous exposures that were deep injuries. If D is the average rate of seroconversion after deep injuries, D(0.068)=(0.52)(0.003). Solving this equation, D=2.3%.
Most deep injuries involved one or more other risk factors as well, whose presence or absence may be different for any speci® ed set of unsafe injections. For example, in the case± control study, 50% of HCWs with percutaneous exposures with one or more risk factors took PEP, but no one gets PEP after an unsafe injection, which raises the estimated risk for seroconversion after unsafe injections above the 2.3% calculated for average deep injuries. On the other hand, 35% of controls in the case± control study reported visible blood (with an OR of 6.2), while 31% reported contact with a needle from a vein or artery (with an OR of 4.3). Although an injection effectively washes the inside of a needle and syringe, very little blood may be present if the syringe has been used for intramuscular or subcutaneous injections.
Finally, 16% of controls involved terminal illness (death within 2 months) in the source patient (with an OR of 5.6). The share of unsafe injections involving a terminally ill patient would presumably be somewhat lower, particularly if we look at non-hospital settings, which is where an infected syringe is most likely to be reused on someone who is not yet infected. On the other hand, children and others with primary infections may be as viremic and infectious as terminal patients.
If D=2.3% is a rough estimate for P(i), from Equation 1:
To the extent that E(c)41 in iatrogenic outbreaks, E(t) will exceed P(i). Even though con® dence intervals around all ORs from the case± control study are large and average characteristics of unsafe injections and deep percutaneous exposures are unknown, the best evidence from percutaneous exposures among HCWs in the USA and Europe is that E(t), HIV transmission ef® ciency through unsafe injections, which are roughly comparable to deep injuries without PEP, is not at all likely to be as low as 0.3± 0.5% and may well exceed 2%.
Nosocomial outbreak in Russia
During 1988, a nosocomial outbreak in Elista, a city in the Kalymk Autonomous Republic in Russia, spread HIV from one to 90 inpatient children in two hospitals over 11 months 32 . Together with a somewhat later and linked nosocomial outbreak in Rostov-on-Don, unsafe intravenous and intramuscular injections spread HIV to about 250 Russian children in 1988± 89 31± 33 . Several children apparently transmitted HIV to their mothers through breast-feeding 34 . Epidemic spread from a single index patient has been established through genetic sequencing of HIV from a sample of 22 children 32 .
The published record does not provide information on the number of injections. However, information is suf® cient to estimate an average rate of transmission in days or months from one infected child to another. In Elista, if we assume that the index patient alone infected all 89 others directly in 11 months (or 334 days), the average time for each transmission would be less than 4 days. This does not allow time for very many medical procedures for the transmitting (index) patient to establish a new infection, which means that E(t) would have to be high.
If, on the other hand, we calculate the average time it takes for the number of infections to double we get the highest possible estimate of the average time for iatrogenic HIV transmission from one child to another. This assumes: that each newly infected child was instantly infectious, whereas new HIV infections generally take 1± 2 weeks to produce infective virus in circulating blood 62 ; and that all infected children were equally infectious over time, although many presumably did not return to the hospital, so that onward transmission was interrupted, and some would have had an effective immune response that reduced viremia and infectiousness to low levels.
In Elista, the epidemic had to double on average every 1.7 months to go from one to 90 within 11 months. Even with this highest possible estimate of the average time for iatrogenic HIV transmission, the time available severely constrains the number of possible injections administered to an infected (transmitting) patient to establish a new infection. If the transmission ef® ciency through unsafe injections were as low as 0.3± 0.5%, an infected child would have to undergo, on average, 200± 333 injections (or more if any subsequent injections were safe and/or any subsequent injectees were already infected) to transmit HIV to one other child. More realistically Ð considering an average time for transmission of not more than 1.7 months Ð infected children transmitted HIV to other children on average after less than a tenth that number of injections, so that E(t) would be an order of magnitude higher than 0.3± 0.5%.
Iatrogenic outbreak in Romania
In June 1989, doctors in Bucharest unexpectedly found HIV in several hospitalized children 36 . Extensive testing during June 1989 through May 1990 found 14% (1046 of 7553) of tested children 0± 3 years old Ð many in hospitals and orphanages Ð to be HIV-positive, but only 0.3% (20 of 6343) of tested adults, concentrated among hospital inpatients. Alerted by the evidence from ongoing tests, non-government organizations, private citizens, and the Ministry of Health responded from late 1989 through early 1990 with communication, behaviour change, and new programs that effectively stopped iatrogenic HIV transmission 36± 37 . UNAIDS has estimated 10 000 infected Romanian children 38 .
It is virtually impossible for blood transfusions to have infected many Romanian children, since only 0.006% (13 of 212 891) of blood donors tested in 1990 were HIV-positive while most iatrogenic transmission to children occurred in 1989 or earlier, when the per cent of infected donors would have been even lower 36 . All of a sample of HIV viruses from Romanian children clustered tightly in the F clade, which excludes imported blood products 37 . One plausible hypothesis is that an infected batch of locally produced gamma globulin was distributed suf® ciently widely to establish coincident outbreaks, with onward transmission through unsafe injections 37 .
From one of the many sad episodes in this iatrogenic outbreak, enough information has been reported to support Ð with some assumptions Ð an estimate for E(t). In June 1990, Hersh and colleagues found 20 children with HIV in a Romanian orphanage; two with AIDS had been removed earlier 35 . Fifteen of 28 children aged 10± 19 months old (54%) and 5 of 40 (13%) children aged 20± 29 months old were infected, but no child under 10 months or over 30 months was infected. Since age-mates tended to be cared for together, the ® rst infections presumably occurred not more than 30 months before June 1990, and the last likely occurred about 10 months before June 1990, so that the total time for iatrogenic HIV transmission to and among orphanage children appears to have been not more than 20 months. If the two removed with AIDS were older, one would expect to see some HIV infections among older children in June 1990.
Infection seems to have spread through unsafe injections, since all relevant blood donors and 10 mothers (all that were tested) were not infected.
With the very low rate of adult HIV-prevalence in Romania in 1990, chances are slim for more than one child in the orphanage to have acquired HIV through vertical transmission. More likely, one (or more) children was infected through injections either before entering the orphanage or during hospitalizations after entering the orphanage. On average, the 20 orphans found with HIV infections at 10± 30 months old had entered the orphanage at 3.7 months-of-age.
In a case± control study with all 20 HIV-infected orphans and 20 age-matched HIV-negative orphans, cases averaged 17.5 months old and had an average of 280 lifetime injections versus 187 for controls. For both cases and controls, roughly 45% of injections took place in the orphanage and 55% in hospitals either before or after entering the orphanage. For children with HIV, an average of 123 of 280 lifetime injections took place in the orphanage, 154 in the hospital, and no site given for 4 vaccinations. Orphanage records for 1989 show 4457 injections and 810 syringes sterilized, so that 82% (17[810/4457]) of injections presumably reused equipment without sterilization. Hersh and colleagues report that sterilization practices at the hospital may have been much better, that sterilization equipment was available, and that statistical tests show that hospital injections were not so strongly associated with HIV infections as were orphanage injections.
To estimate E(t), I assume that one child brought HIV into the orphanage and subsequently infected Ð directly and indirectly Ð 21 orphans. Since some injections took place at the hospital, some orphans may have acquired infections there, so that not all infections can be de® nitively traced to the supposed index case. On the other hand, if sterilization practices at the hospital were no worse than in the orphanage (as Hersh et al. report), and if HIV prevalence in the hospital was no higher than in the orphanage (cf, prevalence in hospital children was lower than in orphanages in 2 out of 3 towns in 1990 for which data are available) 36 , it is likely that orphans in the hospital infected more non-orphans than were infected by non-orphans. Hence, the number of orphans with HIV is more likely to underestimate than to overestimate iatrogenic spread from the ® rst infected orphan.
With the following assumptions, we get a lower bound estimate for E(t): injection practices in the hospital were as bad as in the orphanage; HIV prevalence in the hospital was equal to that in the orphanage; and HIV infection spread from one to 22 children over 20 months, so that it doubled roughly every 4 months (initially, but slowing somewhat as the per cent of susceptibles fell).
From Equation (4), we can calculate E(t) from T, I, P(u), and P(s). If it takes an average of 4 months for an infected child to infect one other through contaminated injections, we can set T=1 and I=the number of injections administered to an infected child in 4 months. Since HIV-positive children had an average of 280 injections in 17.5 months, they averaged 64 injections in 4 months, so that I=64. From orphanage records, 82% of syringes were reused without sterilization, so P(u)=0.82. Initially only one child is infected. If we ignore the possibility that injection equipment is reused on the same infected child, 100% of subsequent injectees were susceptible, so P(s)=1. Substituting in Equation 4:
E…t †ˆT=‰I £ …P…u †£P…s †Š 1=‰…64 †…0:82 †…1 †Šˆ1:9% …6 † Hence, a lower estimate for E(t) is 1/52=1.9%. Estimated E(t) will be higher if: syringes were sterilized more often in the hospital than in the orphanage; the other children injected at the hospital had a lower HIV prevalence than did children from the orphanage; and the time for HIV to spread from one to 22 children was less than 20 months. If injections in the hospital were sterile and/or there were so many other uninfected hospital children that risks for a child from the orphanage to contract HIV at the hospital were insigni® cant, then all orphanage infections were contracted from orphanage injections. If time for HIV to spread from one to 22 children was only 12 months, time to double would be roughly 2.5 months. Infected children averaged 17.6 orphanage injections over 2.5 months (calculating from 123 injections over 17.5 months) so that I=17.6. Substituting in Equation (4):
E…t †ˆ1=‰…17:6 †…0:82 †…1 †Šˆ6:9% …7 † Hence, a plausible range of values for E(t) that ® ts data from the Romanian orphanage is 1.9± 6.9%, or roughly 2± 7%. Since infections were so heavily concentrated in younger children (54% of those aged 10± 19 months old versus 13% of those aged 20± 29 months old) even though younger children had fewer injections, it is likely that infection spread over no more than a year, which favours a high value for E(t).
Nosocomial outbreak in Libya
A nosocomial outbreak discovered in 1998 infected almost 400 inpatient and outpatient children at a hospital in Libya 39 . Serological tests on a large sample of HIV-infected Libyan children showed that about half were infected with hepatitis C and somewhat less with hepatitis B. Genetic sequencing of HIV viruses from 36 children found all to be closely related, suggesting a single index patient as well as rapid epidemic spread, while sequencing of HCV viruses found four clusters.
To go from one to almost 400, the number of HIV infections doubled 8.5 times. Available information does not indicate how long the epidemic lasted before discovery in 1998, but one study reports that all of a large sample of infected children had one to 7 visits to the same hospital for vaccination, injections, drawing blood, and other procedures 39 . With so few visits, infected children presumably had far less than the 200± 333 injections required on average to pass HIV to another child if E(t) is in the range 0.3± 0.5%. Hence, limited information from the Libyan outbreak suggests much higher values for E(t).
New Haven IDUs sharing injection equipment
With a mathematical model and data from IDUs in New Haven, Connecticut, Kaplan and Heimer estimated a,`the conditional probability of HIV transmission given injection with a contaminated syringe', which is equivalent to P(i) in this paper, to be 0.67% 61 . However, this result depends on several assumptions that could have led to an underestimate of the true rate. First, calculations of P(i) from the model are based on an equilibrium HIV prevalence among IDUs, with some injectors seroconverting at the same rate as others die. Calculated transmission ef® ciency is lower with lower HIV prevalence. If injection behaviour varies across the group of IDUs used to generate data for the model, so that overall prevalence is held down by a subgroup of IDUs with more careful injection habits, the estimate of transmission ef® ciency derived from the model may be too low.
Second, Kaplan and Heimer assumed an average sharing frequency of 31.5%, based on their observation from a needle-exchange programme that 31.5% of needles were returned by someone other than the person who took them, even though clients of the programme reported an 8.7% sharing frequency. As the authors note, if they had used the lower reported sharing frequency, their equations would have estimated a transmission ef® ciency of 2.4%. Since people can return and collect more than one needle at a time, it seems reasonable that friends would take turns returning needles, so that sharing frequency would be less than the share of needles returned by someone else, and could be 8.7% as reported. Hence, depending on several assumptions concerning their data, estimates of P(i) from Kaplan and Heimer's model could agree with higher or lower estimates for E(t).
DISCUSSION
Evidence from seroconversions in HCWs after percutaneous exposures and three iatrogenic outbreaks leads to several observations:
. The assumption that E(t) is in the range 0.3± 0.5% is unsupported. The source for these estimates is the rate of seroconversion among HCWs in the USA and Europe after average percutaneous exposures. With the CDC's case± control study 59, 60 , the best estimate from HCW seroconversions after percutaneous exposures is that transmission ef® ciency through unsafe injections Ð which resemble deep injuries without PEP Ð may well be over 2%.
. To estimate the rate of iatrogenic transmission through unsafe injections, it is important to maintain a perspective that includes all factors that might spread HIV from an infected injectee to one or more others. Transmission depends not only on P(i), the probability that someone receiving a contaminated injection will seroconvert, but also on medical practices that can spread HIV from an infected injectee to contaminate multiple subsequent injections, e.g. through multidose vials and rinsing pans, as well as through syringe reuse without sterilization. . Simple logic suggests that transmission through some types of injections may be more ef® cient than for all injections. If so, transmission ef® ciency in Elista, Romania, and Libya through more dangerous parenteral procedures Ð such as introducing and maintaining an intravenous catheter Ð may have been well over 10%.
These observations have implications for modelbased estimates of the contribution of unsafe injections to Africa's HIV epidemic. With values of E(t) that are an order of magnitude above what most models have used to date, the estimated contribution from unsafe injections will similarly be an order of magnitude higher. New estimates may well agree with epidemiological studies in countries with generalized epidemics showing PAFs for medical injections of 20± 40% or more 23± 30,40 and 10± 20% or more of HIV infections in children and adults not unexplained by vertical or sexual transmission 14± 22 . These observations also have implications for steps to control iatrogenic transmission and to avoid personal risks. Health care settings that are particularly dangerous include those with high HIV prevalence among patients and where patients return for multiple treatments over months, so that someone infected through health care is likely to return within weeks or months, highly viraemic with a primary infection. For example, if E(t) is in the range 2± 7%, someone going for STD treatment in a facility where the HIV prevalence among outpatients is 33% would face a risk of 0.7± 2.2% ([0.33] [0.02] to [0.33] [0.07]) to contract HIV from a single unsafe injection (in many African countries, the standard course for suspected syphilis at least into the 1980s entailed 10 injections, which multiplied the risk).
Estimates of HIV transmission ef® ciency in medical settings in this paper are based for the most part Ð like all previous estimates Ð on evidence from outside sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia where unsafe medical injections are most likely to be a signi® cant contributor to overall HIV incidence. Well-designed research into risk factors for HIV is needed to overcome problems with confounding between medical and sexual exposures. Also, thorough research into iatrogenic HIV outbreaks in Africa (e.g. cases of multiple HIVpositive children with HIV-negative mothers) could support estimates of the share of African HIV infections from unsafe health care and could identify the most dangerous medical procedures. Finally, research to test interventions could lead to more effective programs to reduce iatrogenic infections.
Considering the large share of health care that Africans and Asians buy from a wide range of private and public providers, signi® cant cuts in iatrogenic transmission may be achieved by understanding, respecting, and working with health care consumers.
